

# Isochronous Gaussian Sampling: From Inception to Implementation

With Applications to the Falcon Signature Scheme

James Howe - Thomas Prest - Thomas Ricosset - Mélissa Rossi



THALES



# Falcon

(P-A Fouque, J. Hoffstein, P. Kirchner, V. Lyubashevsky, T. Pornin, T. Prest, T. Ricosset, G. Seiler, W. Whyte, Z. Zhang)



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Using Fast Fourier  
Orthogonalization

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Compact signatures

$|s| + |pk|$  minimized

# Falcon in a nutshell

$$\mathcal{R} = \frac{\mathbb{Z}_q[x]}{x^n + 1}$$

KeyGen()

- Generate matrices  $A, B$  with coefficients in  $\mathcal{R}$  such that  $\begin{cases} BA = 0 \\ B \text{ has small coefficients} \end{cases}$
- $pk \leftarrow A$
- $sk \leftarrow B$


Sign( $m, sk$ )

- Compute  $c$  such that  $cA = H(m)$
- $v \leftarrow$  a vector in  $\Lambda(B)$  close to  $c$
- $s \leftarrow c - v$

Verify( $m, pk, s$ )

Accept iff:

$$\begin{cases} s \text{ is short} \\ sA = H(m) \end{cases}$$



# Falcon round I

## Advantages

- ✓ Compact
- ✓ Fast
- ✓ GPV framework proved secure in the ROM and QROM (Boneh et al. ASIACRYPT 2011)



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Selected to round II and later round III

# Falcon and implementation attacks

## Limitations

- ❑ Non Trivial to understand and implement
- ❑ Floating point arithmetic
- ❑ Side channel resistance not very studied

### Side channel attacks targeting Gaussians

- ▶ Espitau et al. SAC'2016
- ▶ Fouque et al EUROCRYPT'2020

### Implementation issues

#### Portability issues:

- Floating point arithmetics
- Many subtleties for implementing the Gaussian sampler

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Need for timing protection



# « Constant time » is a confusing term

Constant time does not mean constant execution time

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Assumption

$+$ ,  $-$ ,  $\times$ ,  $/$

Constant time on integers

# Contributions of this work

- ☑ Integer arithmetic for the Gaussian sampling for Falcon
- ☑ Theoretically studied isochrony
- ☑ Test suite : Statistically Acceptable Gaussians (SAGA)
- ☑ Implementations

# What is not isochronous in Falcon?

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Gaussian Sampling  
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Except Gaussian sampling, other operations do not use conditional branching

# Isochronous Gaussian sampling

## Some literature on Gaussian Samplers:

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
## Idea

Construct a distribution that **looks somewhat** like a Gaussian but is not statistically close, and use **rejection sampling** to correct the discrepancy.

# The sampling distribution

$$1.31 = \sigma_{min} \leq \sigma \leq \sigma_0 = 1.82$$

$$\mu \in [0,1)$$






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
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
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# The technique


- 1 Draw an element  $z_0$  from a centered half Gaussian of standard deviation  $\sigma_0$






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2 Draw  $b$  uniformly at random in  $\{0,1\}$  and compute  $z \leftarrow (2b - 1) \cdot z_0 + b$



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
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
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# The technique

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Rejection Sampling (Lyubashevsky EC 2012) Accept with probability  $P_{\text{accept}} \propto \frac{D_{\sigma, \mu}(z)}{G_{\mathbb{Z}, \sigma_0}(z)}$



# Falcon's Gaussian sampler

## Algorithm SampleZ( $\sigma, \mu$ )

Require:  $\mu \in [0,1), \sigma \leq \sigma_0$

Ensure:  $z \sim D_{\mathbb{Z},\sigma,\mu}$

1.  $z_0 \leftarrow \text{Basesampler}()$
2.  $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$  uniformly
3.  $z \leftarrow (2b - 1) \cdot z_0 + b$
4.  $x \leftarrow -\frac{(z - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2} + \frac{z_0^2}{2\sigma_0^2}$
5. Accept with probability  $\exp(x)$   
Restart to 1. otherwise

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
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


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$$P_{\text{accept}} = \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{(z - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)}{\exp\left(-\frac{z_0^2}{2\sigma_0^2}\right)}$$



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## Algorithm $\text{SampleZ}(\sigma, \mu)$

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### Isochrony details

- 1) Basesampler with a table
- 2) Polynomial approximation for exp
- 3) Make the number of iterations independent from the secret

# Rényi divergence and security

## Security analysis

- 1 Our sampler is isochronous with respect to the standard deviation  $\sigma$ , the center  $\mu$  and the sampled value  $z$ .
- 2 Using our sampler on a  $\lambda$ -bit secure signature scheme provides  $\lambda - 2$  bits of security.

See our paper for the proof

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## Rényi divergence tool

Take two cryptographic schemes

- One with distribution  $\mathcal{P}$
- One with an approximate distribution  $\mathcal{Q}$  with the same support

Suppose that :

1.  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{Q}$  are close enough :  $\left\| 1 - \frac{\mathcal{Q}}{\mathcal{P}} \right\|_{\infty} \leq 2^{-K}$
2. the number of sample queries is bounded

Then, the bit security will remain almost the same.

- ▶ T. Prest  
ASIACRYPT'17
- ▶ S. Bai, A. Langlois, T. Lepoint, D. Stehle, and R. Steinfeld.  
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# A technical independence issue in isochrony

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Let  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{Q}$  denote two distributions of a  $N$ -uple of variables  $(x_i)$ .

## Multiplicativity

If the random variables  $(x_i)$  are independent,

$$R_a(\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{P}) = \prod_i R_a(\mathcal{Q}_i, \mathcal{P}_i)$$

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## One issue

The multiplicativity result can only be applied if the distributions  $\mathcal{P}_i$  are independent.

OK for Fiat-Shamir with aborts signatures.

Not ok for Falcon where  $\sigma$  and  $\mu$  are dependent.

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If for every preceding drawn values of

$$x_{<i} = (x_0, \dots, x_{i-1}), \\ R_a(\mathcal{Q}_{i|x_{<i}}, \mathcal{P}_{i|x_{<i}}) \leq r_{a,i}.$$

Then, the Renyi divergence of  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{Q}$  is also bounded

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# The isochronous sampler

- ☐ Basesampler with a table
- ☐ Polynomial approximation for exp
- ☐ Make the number of iterations independent from the secret

# I) Sampling with a table

BaseSampler() close to  $D_{\mathbb{Z}^+, \sigma_0}$

Cumulative Distribution Table (*CDT*) with  $w$  elements of  $\theta$  bits

CDT sampling can be done in constant time if the algorithm reads the entire table each time and carry out each comparison

# I) Sampling with a table

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We provide a script that generates  $w$  and the *CDT* table  
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We provide a script that generates  $w$  and the *CDT* table for a given target precision  $\epsilon = 2^{-80}$  and  $\theta$

## Algorithm Renyification( $\sigma, \epsilon, \theta$ )

Require:  $\sigma, \epsilon \leq 0, \theta$

Ensure:  $w$ , the *CDT* table

1.  $w \leftarrow$  Smallest tailcut such that  $R_a \left( D_{[w], \sigma_0}, D_{\mathbb{Z}^+, \sigma_0} \right) \leq 1 + \epsilon$
2. Compute the table values with a « clever » rounding
  1. For  $z \geq 1$ ,  $CDT(z) \leftarrow 2^{-\theta} \left\lfloor 2^\theta \cdot D_{[w], \sigma_0}(z) \right\rfloor$
  2.  $CDT(0) \leftarrow 1 - \sum_{z \geq 1} CDT(z)$
3. Recompute Rényi divergence and return the new precision,  $w$  and *CDT*

# I) CDT Sampling

$$R_{\infty} \left( \text{BaseSampler}(), D_{\mathbb{Z}^+, \sigma_0} \right) \leq 1 + 2^{-80}$$

For  $\sigma_0 = 1.8205$ , our script gave

$w = 19$   
elements

$\theta = 72$  bits

$\epsilon = 80$

$$\text{CDT}(0) = 2^{-72} \times 1697680241746640300030$$

$$\text{CDT}(1) = 2^{-72} \times 1459943456642912959616$$

$$\text{CDT}(2) = 2^{-72} \times 928488355018011056515$$

$$\text{CDT}(3) = 2^{-72} \times 436693944817054414619$$

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$$\text{CDT}(9) = 2^{-72} \times 8370422445201343$$

$$\text{CDT}(10) = 2^{-72} \times 476288472308334$$

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$$\text{CDT}(12) = 2^{-72} \times 623729532807$$

$$\text{CDT}(13) = 2^{-72} \times 4354889437$$

$$\text{CDT}(14) = 2^{-72} \times 244322621$$

$$\text{CDT}(15) = 2^{-72} \times 3075302$$

$$\text{CDT}(16) = 2^{-72} \times 28626$$

$$\text{CDT}(17) = 2^{-72} \times 197$$

$$\text{CDT}(18) = 2^{-72} \times 1$$

# The isochronous sampler

- ☒ Basesampler with a table
- ☐ Polynomial approximation for exp
- ☐ Make the number of iterations independent from the secret



## 2) Polynomial approximation

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Find } P \text{ such that } & \left| \frac{P(x) - \exp(x)}{\exp(x)} \right| \leq 2^{-44} \quad \forall x \in [0, \ln(2)] \\ \text{and } & \left| \frac{P(x) - \exp(x)}{1 - \exp(x)} \right| \leq 2^{-44} \quad \forall x \in [0, \ln(2)] \end{aligned}$$

Polynomial approximation tools

◆ Floating points option: FACCT by Zhao, Steinfeld and Sakzad 2018/1234

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
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32-bit coefficients

degree 10



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
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
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Zhao, Steinfeld and Sakzad (2018/1234)

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The number of iterations follows a geometric distribution of average  $\frac{2 \cdot \rho_{\sigma_0}(\mathbb{Z}^+)}{\rho_{\sigma, \mu}(\mathbb{Z})}$

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The acceptance probability  $P_{\text{accept}}$  is scaled by a factor  $\frac{\sigma_{\min}}{\sigma} \leq \frac{\sigma_{\min}}{\sigma_{\max}} \approx 0.73$

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The whole algorithm  
is constant time

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We propose this because:

- ☑ Implementation failures are possible, e.g. inaccuracy or incorrectness in CDT table values.
- ☑ Implementation failures can also be found if the base Gaussian sampler is validated, but the outputs are not.
- ☑ Randomness / entropy levels not being sufficient.
- ☑ SAGA only works on outputs, thus it is completely agnostic to the sampling method or scheme used.

# Statistically Acceptable Gaussians

Our second contribution is SAGA, a statistical test suite.

More specifically SAGA can validate:

- ☑ Univariate Gaussian samples for base Gaussian samplers useful for samplers in FrodoKEM, DLP-IBE, FHE, etc.
- ☑ Multivariate Gaussian samples for outputs of schemes useful for Falcon, DLP-IBE, LATTE, etc.
- ☑ Supplementary, graphical, and sanity check tests for things like rejection rates, uni-, and multi-variate normality.

# SAGA Tests on Univariate Samples

- ☑ First we compare the Expected vs Empirical observations for mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis.
- ☑ Secondly we perform a chi-squared normality test.

```
Testing a Gaussian sampler with center = -0.920619 and sigma = 1.711864
Number of samples: 100

Moments | Expected      Empiric
-----+-----
Mean:   | -0.92062      -0.92000
St. dev. | 1.71186       1.51446
Skewness | 0.00000       -0.25650
Kurtosis | 0.00000       -0.26704

Chi-2 statistic: 4.033416341364921
Chi-2 p-value: 0.4015023295495953 (should be > 0.001)

How many outliers? 0

Is the sample valid? True
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An example output for testing univariate samples from a (base) Gaussian sampler.



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
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


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(a) Observed vs Expected Gaussian PDF




(b) QQ-plot of Observed vs Expected Quantiles


A visual representation of checking normality for the univariate Gaussian samples.

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# SAGA Tests on Multivariate Samples

1. Can we find errors if the base sampler is designed well?

☑ Incorrect tree designs in Falcon will affect its covariance.

☑ We thus posit that covariance in (block-)sub-diagonals:

☑ grow in  $O(\sqrt{n})$  for correct implementations and

☑ grow in  $O(n)$  for incorrect implementations.

☑ Test 3 uses this (p-value) in a chi-squared test.

```
1 - Covariance matrix (128 x 128):  
[[ 0.997   -0.0021  0.0065 ...  0.0014  0.0012 -0.0039]  
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

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

A properly functioning Falcon implementation VS an implementation with a mistake when constructing the Falcon tree.



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# SAGA Tests on Multivariate Samples

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
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
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A visual representation of the Mahalanobis distance.

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
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
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
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
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
- ☑ Rejections modelled to observe the geometric decrease.






# SAGA Supplementary Tests

- ☑ Mahalanobis distance visualises multivariate normality.
- ☑ The distance measures std. devs. of each point from distribution.
- ☑ Empirical vs Expected should follow a chi-square distribution.
- ☑ QQ-plot (+ $R^2$  value) visualise this.




- ☑ Rejections modelled to observe the geometric decrease.






# Implementations



- ✓ Our sampler in Falcon on one Intel Core i7-6500U CPU @2.5GHz.
- ✓ The performance loss for isochrony is minimal (13% - 18%).

# Implementations

Number of Falcon Signatures Per Second



- ☑ Our sampler in Falcon on one Intel Core i7-6500U CPU @2.5GHz.
- ☑ The performance loss for isochrony is minimal (13% - 18%).

**Thanks for Listening**